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Abstract 
 Poverty impacts hundreds of millions of people around the world. Poor nutrition, housing 
and living conditions, and other adverse effects from poverty have a lasting impact on those 
unfortunate enough to be in poverty. In this paper, I test for convergence of the Watts index of 
poverty across over forty countries over a period of fifteen years.  
 My model is based on a previous model formulated by Miao and Dhongde (2013). We 
model the annual average growth rate of the Watts index as a function of the index in the initial 
year t = 0. We can then test for convergence or divergence across varying time horizons, such as 
t = 5, 10, or 15 years. We found that there is some significant evidence for divergence of the 



















Poverty is an incredibly important and widespread problem. It is generally defined by a 
poverty line, where being below the poverty line defines you as being “in poverty”. This line is 
based on the costs of living and varies by country. The poverty line in the United States for a 
single person with no children under the age of 65 in 2014 was $12,316, and that number only 
increases as the size of the family unit increases. In 2013, 14.5% of the entire population of the 
United States was considered to be in poverty, which totals up to be 45.3 million people 
considered to be in poverty. Poverty lines generally differ between countries. However, there is 
an international poverty line, which is currently set to be earning $1.25 a day or less. 
It is important to make a distinction between absolute and relative poverty when dealing 
with poverty lines of different countries. Gross National Income per capita, or GNI, is a decent 
indicator of standards of living. The GNI per capita of the United States in 2013 was $53,470. 
This is a stark contrast to the $440 GNI per capita of Uganda. The poverty line for one person in 
the United States is $12,316 of income for one year. This means that an American with only 
$5,000 in income would be considered very deep into poverty in the United States. However, this 
same person with $5,000 of income in Uganda would be incredibly rich and far above the 
poverty line. A person in Uganda that earns only fifty cents a day would be considered both 
absolutely and relatively deep in poverty. This is an example of the importance of distinguishing 
between poverty lines and dealing with absolute vs. relative poverty when examining differing 
countries. This difference in countries becomes even more pronounced when Federal programs 
are introduced. Programs that assist the poor in the United States, such as the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, otherwise known as food stamps) and Federal subsidies 
do not count when determining who is in poverty. Thus, even the poorest Americans may still be 
better off than some of the slightly less poor, but still in poverty, Ugandans.  
The Obama administration has made it a priority to fight poverty in the United States. 
There have been numerous programs introduced over the years in the United States to combat 
poverty. From food stamps to a progressive tax system to tax breaks, the number of benefits to 
those in need have increased in recent years due to the Great Recession. However, these 
increased benefits are still not enough to eliminate poverty in the United States, with a small, but 
non-zero, number of people living underneath the World Bank’s international poverty line of 
$1.25 a day. 
This paper will look at poverty as measured by the Watts index. A more common 
measure of poverty until this point has been the headcount ratio, which is the proportion of 
people who live at or below the poverty line. This is an effective measurement, but does not pick 
up on absolute poverty changes. As an example, country “X” has a headcount ratio of 0.10 (that 
is, ten percent of the population in country X has income less than or equal to the poverty line). 
If those ten percent of people become poorer, then the country’s poor fall deeper into poverty, 
but the headcount ratio will stay the same. Thus, I believe the Watts index is a superior measure 
of poverty because it takes into account both the number of people in poverty and how deep into 
poverty each person is. The Watts index is defined as 
 
 where W is the index, N is the population, q is the population living beneath the poverty line, z 
is the poverty line, and yi is the income of person i. The Watts index incorporates important 
facets of an accurate representation of poverty in a country, and is, as a result, an effective 
representation of poverty in a country.  
 
Literature Review 
Poverty is the subject of much research by scholars and is important to understand for 
government officials as well. This is why an accurate and valid measure of poverty is critical to 
effective measurement and policy considerations. A poverty measure should not be affected by 
the income distribution of those not in poverty, it should increase if a poor person’s income 
decreases, and it should be decomposable (that is, the index should increase when poverty in a 
subgroup of the population in poverty increases as well) (Foster, Greer, & Thorbecke, 1984). The 
Watts index is one of the few measures of poverty that satisfies these requirements.  
There have been other studies conducted on poverty convergence. Classic economic 
theory dictates that countries with low mean income tend to have higher economic growth 
(Ravallion, 2012). Mean income is related to a countries means of production, and countries with 
a lower mean income will generally have less human and physical capital than more developed 
countries. However, because of the law of diminishing returns, these well developed countries 
tend to have slower growth rates. In theory, businesses will invest in new capital in these poorer 
countries, where there is less capital so that there will not be diminishing returns. As a result, 
poorer countries will enjoy relatively quick growth in the form of “catch-up” effects. There are 
problems, however, with this theory in practice. For one, poorer countries may have higher 
potential returns, but their risk may also be substantially higher as well, which can severely hurt 
investment. The classic theory of convergence in economics also generally assumes that poorer 
countries can quickly and easily adapt and copy the new and very efficient methods of 
production of the richer countries, which is not always feasible. Ravallion found that high levels 
of initial poverty had a dampening effect on the growth rates of these countries, and he also 
found that there is no evidence of convergence of poverty levels. The populations in poverty 
stricken countries will, almost by definition, be forced to spend most or all of their money on 
simple subsistence and are not able to invest their money into their country or abroad. This 
leaves little room for capital investment in poor countries without foreign intervention. This 
problem is compounded by the already risky prospect of investing in countries without proper 
infrastructure. A family in poverty will also, in many cases, not have enough money to provide 
enough food and nutrition for themselves. This has long lasting effects on the population itself. 
Poor nutrition leads to a lower life expectancy on average, which reduces the aggregate output of 
an economy. Combine that with the very low savings and investment in a country with high 
initial poverty, and it is no surprise that high poverty levels can constrain growth and we have 
not seen poverty convergence. 
In attempting to calculate the World Distribution of Income, or WDI, Xavier Sala-i-
Martin also calculated poverty rates during the time period of 1970-2000. Once he calculated the 
WDI, he was able to use this information to find poverty rates for multiple regions and at 
multiple times. He analyzed four separate poverty lines. These lines were designated by the 
World Bank and calculated using a 1, 2, 1.5, or 3 dollar a day rate of income. He also analyzed 
poverty rates for East Asia, South Asia, Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe, MENA, and the 
entire World. By using headcount ratios, he found that, in general, the absolute number of people 
in poverty decreased over time worldwide and the rate of poverty steadily decreased from 1970 
to 2000. Poverty decreased by nearly a factor of three worldwide over the thirty years analyzed. 
However, not all regions received this same reduction in poverty rates. World, Asia, and MENA 
(Middle East and North Africa) regions all experienced poverty decline over the thirty year 
period. Latin America and Eastern Europe saw both decline and increase, but they both saw an 
average decrease over the thirty year period. Africa, however, when analyzed during ten year 
intervals, saw no reduction in poverty over time. In fact, Africa, in 1970, accounted for 13.4% of 
the world’s poor. But in 2000, Africa held 74.5% of the world’s poor, despite having only 10.7% 
of the world’s population! This information implies that poverty may be decreasing over time as 
a whole (and, thus, converging), but not in certain regions. 
Martin also made it clear that careful analysis of variables and how they are used is 
critical to obtain valid observations derived from data analysis. In his paper, he tells us that the 
literature before him showed that incomes tended to diverge and that there was no correlation 
between growth rates and income per capita. However, these figures and facts used data that was 
not population weighted, which biased the data. Once the countries being used in the analysis 
were weighted by population, he found that “the incomes of poor citizens have grown faster (β-
convergence), and measures of income inequality have declined (σ-convergence)” (Martin 
2006). 
Another factor that cannot be denied analysis is income inequality in poor countries. 
François Bourguignon found in his paper on growth, poverty, and income inequality that a high 
level of income inequality reduced the growth elasticity of poverty, which is the percentage 
reduction in poverty rates divided by a percentage change in mean income (Bourguignon, 2002). 
This essentially means that those who are both in poverty and in a country with high income 
inequality will see much smaller reductions in poverty given an increase in income per capita. 
This is important to policy makers and scholars alike because the typical response to reducing 
poverty in the long run has been to provide sustained growth in the economy. This is generally 
an effective strategy, but efforts to affect the elasticity of poverty in addition to sustained growth 
may be a more effective option in alleviating the poverty problem. Bourguignon suggests that a 
permanent redistribution of income will “double dip” in reducing poverty by both alleviating 
some poverty through a “distribution effect” and by increasing the poverty elasticity of growth, 
which will result in an increase in the rate of poverty reduction. 
This paper aims to add to the current literature by looking at a different measure of 
poverty than the headcount ratio. The current literature has put an emphasis on using the 
headcount ratio, as it is widely available and intuitive to use and interpret. While the headcount 
ratio is useful for determining poverty rates, it is insufficient at measuring the depth of poverty 
beneath the poverty line and does not fulfill the principles that Ravallion claims make a good 
poverty index. Although the Watts index is not very intuitive to interpret, it is nevertheless a 




All of the data has been compiled from the World Bank’s PovcalNet (Povcal). The World 
Bank publishes information on income inequality and poverty. The headcount ratio, poverty gap, 
Watts index, and mean log deviation of income are just some of the numbers available. There are 
over one hundred countries for which data is available. However, many countries are missing 
data values for some years, and some countries have relatively little information available. As an 
example, there are only two points of data on the Watts index available for Algeria (in 1988 and 
1995), whereas Brazil has all but four data points available from the years 1985 to 2012. In 
addition, while there is a lot of data available, not all of it is high quality. Many countries have 
data entries that are not valid and, as a result, are not good for data analysis. As an example, 
Burundi has a Watts index of 63.03 in the year 1992, but a data entry of “n/a” for 1998. There 
are also many entries of “not a number” for many of the countries, which does not make much 
sense and has little value for analysis. In addition, the regression equation I used estimated for 
convergence over five year increments, but some countries either had no data for those years or 
had no data within two years of the desired year. If a country was missing a year of data for 
either 1995, 2000, 2005, or 2010, but an adjacent year contained data, then either the average of 
the adjacent years or the closest year for which there was data was used. Finally, some data had 
very large deviations and outliers in certain years. These outliers were corrected for by averaging 
the yearly data points before and after the outlier year. Because of these limitations, I only used 
data that had consistent data over time without any nonsensical data points and data that had 
outliers that could be corrected. This limited my data to only forty countries, but forty should be 
sufficient for a simple regression. Of these forty countries, some did not have data for 1995. 
Only thirty-three countries were able to be used in equations involving 1995, which is still 
enough for a simple regression. Graph 1 shows the average Watts index of all countries sampled 
for each year. 
Graph 1 
 
The graph shows that poverty has roughly trended downward over the past 15 years, with a spike 
in the year 2000. This is consistent with the literature’s finding that poverty levels have been 
more or less decreasing over time. Graph 2 references the average headcount ratio from 1995 to 
2010 in the sampled countries. I compiled this data in order to see if the decreasing trends in 
poverty mentioned in the literature are continuing today. It would seem that the trends of 1970 to 
2000 are continuing today, with strong poverty decline being shown – especially in the more 
recent years of 2005 and 2010. These two graphs also highlight an interesting point to note 
regarding the measurement of poverty. The Watts index clearly trended upward from 1995 to 
2000, but the headcount ratio stayed nearly the same. This implies that those who were in 





My poverty line of choice was the line set forth by the World Bank, which is set to be an 
income of $1.25 a day. This line is consistent across all of our observations, which eliminates the 






The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show the forty countries’ means and standard 
deviations used in the analysis. A list of countries used with descriptive statistics is provided in 
the appendix. There is a very high variance in the data, with a relatively high standard deviation 
for each year. This is not surprising, considering the wide range of countries used in the analysis. 
Because there were some countries with missing data on or around 1995, there are only 33 
observations for the 1995 variable. 
This paper uses the regression equation put forth by Miao and Dhongde in their paper on 
Gini index convergence. The dependent variable in the equation is a representation of the growth 
rate of the Watts index over time. Using the natural logarithm linearizes the numbers and turns 
them into growth rates. By dividing by the time over which the equation is estimated, we obtain 
the growth rate in the index from the initial to final year as the dependent variable. The 
independent variable is the natural logarithm of the Watts index in the initial year, along with a 
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Where t is the initial year, T is the final year, α is a constant, β is the convergence coefficient, 
and 𝑢𝑖 is the zero mean error term. A negative convergence coefficient would imply that the 
growth of the Watts index is converging over time, and a positive coefficient would imply that 
the index growth is diverging over time. 
 When interpreting the results, it is important to remember the Gauss Markov assumptions 
and make sure they apply to the regression equation. The first assumption – linearity of 
parameters, is indeed satisfied in this equation. The expected value of the error term is also zero 
for all given observations. As there is only one independent variable, we do not have to worry 
about multicolinearity in our model. In addition, the error term is not correlated with our 
observations and the error term is independently distributed. Finally, are errors are 
homoscedastic, which means that all of our Gauss-Markov assumptions are satisfied by our 
model. However, the model does assume that all countries are structurally similar, which is 
certainly not the case. Miao and Dhongde found that Gini coefficients in developed countries 
converged to a different value than developing countries using the same model, and it is not a 
stretch to imagine the same can happen to poverty indices. When more data becomes available, it 
would be wise to separate developed and developing countries in the analysis. 
 
Results 
 The results show that there is some evidence for divergence of the growth of the Watts 
index over time. The convergence coefficients ranged from -0.02 to 0.04. However, only two of 
the regression outputs were statistically significant. These two statistically significant outputs 
were from 2000 to 2010 and from 2005 to 2010, and these coefficients were 0.026 and 0.040, 
respectively. These significant coefficients are positive, which suggests that the growth in the 
Watts index diverged over these time periods, rather than converged as other measures of 
poverty have indicated. The time period of 1995 to 2010 did not have a significant coefficient, 
which suggests that the index has only been diverging in very recent years. This is further 
supported by the fact that the 2005 to 2010 time period coefficient is more significant than the 
2000 to 2010 coefficient, and that the 2000 to 2005 coefficient is not statistically significant. 
Other time periods, such as from 1995-2000, were tested as well, but they were not statistically 
significant either. Table 2 shows the date ranges over which convergence was estimated, as well 
as the coefficient and standard error of the estimation. 
Table 2 











































(* indicates significance, significant at *10%, **5%, ***1% levels) 
As is evident in the table, only the coefficients for 2000-2005 and 2000-2010 were 
significant. In order to test the robustness of these results for outliers, a robust regression was 
performed in Stata as well. A robust regression is used when possible outliers can heavily 
influence and affect both the statistical significance and the OLS estimators.  The results are 
shown in Table 3. The data appeared to only contain one very strong outlier, which was removed 
for this regression. As can be seen in Table 3, the same hypothesis that the Watts index has been 
diverging in recent years is upheld. The significance of the 2005-2010 equation is reduced, but it 
is still a statistically significant finding, and the p-value of the 2005-2010 equation was 0.051, 
which is also incredibly close to 5% significance.  
 
Table 3 












































 When considering the results, it is important to understand what the Watts index 
diverging actually “means”. The form of equation used measures the growth in the index. If the 
growth were converging, then eventually the index would hover around a singular number across 
all countries as growth became slower and eventually reached zero. As it is diverging, this means 
that the growth rate so far has not shown evidence that it is approaching a steady state yet and 
may not be able to reach a steady state for some time. The literature points to a relatively steady 
decrease in poverty over time, and the index has been shown to be decreasing over more recent 
time periods as well. The only explanation for this is that the Watts index of poverty is 
decreasing, and the growth rate of this decrease is not converging or slowing down. If this is the 
case, and we assume that the index itself is decreasing over time, this implies that countries are, 
on average, decreasing their levels of poverty faster than in the past. What exactly is changing in 
the country is not clear, however. A decrease in population beneath the poverty line will affect 
the index, but so will an increase in income of the poor in the country, which means a 
comparison to the headcount ratio will be required to pinpoint where the decrease in poverty 
happened. If it is true that the index is diverging and steadily decreasing over time, eventually we 
may see convergence to a much lower steady state. Further research would be required to verify 
or disprove this claim. 
 
Conclusion 
 Poverty in the world we live in is a serious problem. There is evidence that poverty has 
been steadily decreasing in the world since as early as the 1970’s, but we are far from done 
fighting poverty. Even in the United States there are people who live on less than $1.25 a day of 
income. Divergence in the growth of the Watts index implies that the change in poverty growth 
or decline is not slowing down or converging. This is uplifting news to hear when we can 
observe that poverty is decreasing overall in the world when measured by both the headcount 
ratio and the Watts index (and, thus, poverty is decreasing faster than in the past). 
There are further research opportunities in inequality and poverty in countries. For one, 
having access to more high quality data will allow more accurate regressions and the ability to 
differentiate between structurally similar countries. Classical growth models imply that 
developed countries will slow their growth and converge to a relatively constant growth rate, 
while developing countries will grow much quicker due to the different in physical and human 
capital between the countries. An analysis of developing countries may yield different results 
than an analysis of developing countries. In addition, more research could be done in looking at 
the results of poverty reductions. Nearly all of contemporary research uses the headcount ratio, 
which does not look at relative depth of poverty for those already under the line. Comparisons of 
the headcount ratio to the Watts index (or other, depth sensitive poverty indices) could show how 
poverty reduction policy is affecting those in the country. Finally, more in depth analysis of 
African countries and their structure and poverty rates could provide insight into how poverty 
works in these countries. The literature indicated a huge increase in poverty in African countries 
while the rest of the world’s poverty rates either stayed relatively constant or fell dramatically. 
Further research into what’s holding back African countries from seeing the same level of 
poverty reductions could be crucial to understanding poverty’s causes and informing policy 
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